

Bence Balassa

“GOTT IS TOT”

METAPHYSICS AND PHENOMENON – CRISIS AND COUNTERMOVEMENT

“The ancient gods ridiculed men, envied them, hunted them down on occasion, harried them. The God of the Gospels was least mocking and less jealous, and mortal men did not even enjoy, in their miseries, the consolation of being able to accuse Him. Which accounts for the absence or the impossibility of a Christian Aeschylus. A good God has killed tragedy. Zeus deserved differently of literature.” (E.M. Cioran)

European nihilism is the movement of history that runs through previous ages, as recognized by Nietzsche, in the light of which thinking reveals itself. This movement of history or world-process, that, according to Nietzsche, the 19th century is determined by, is the result of a metaphysical momentum that is dominant and decisive in the cognitive act of human conscience, and its essence is expressed by the three-word sentence “God is dead” in the most concise way possible.¹ Nihilism is created by the metaphysical inclination of man by showing the long dead Buddha’s “tremendous, gruesome shadow”² on the wall of a cave for centuries. “And we – we must still defeat his shadow as well!” Because of man’s own intentionality, namely, because man by nature has purpose with existence, metaphysics as a phenomenon with regards to the world-process of nihilism is seen and used in cognition by a conscience that isolates itself from the true experience of existence; more precisely, in what is identified as cognition that can be explained by causality. Apart from this, man has nothing to find and say with certainty: *I know*. Man does not make understanding true nihilism accessible to himself because he suspects that what is at stake is no less than the existence of a complete philosophical tradition that is based on the idealistic concept of truth, ultimately man’s own truth and that of the world. Defeating God’s shadow can only begin by clarifying the origin of cognition because the validity of cognition itself is at stake: the legitimization of thinking when it is always directed at something.

¹ This sentence first appears in 1882, in book 3 of *The Gay Science*, which, according to Heidegger, “was the beginning of Nietzsche’s path toward developing his fundamental metaphysical position.” Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track* 160)

² Nietzsche 109.

For Nietzsche thinking means the need to present [vorstellen] existence as being, and for this reason, with Heidegger’s words, “all metaphysical thinking is ontology” as well, “or it is nothing at all.”³ The unthinking of the truth of being signifies the missing experience that is denied from thinking, and thus, thinking itself in the form of metaphysics, even without knowing, conceals the event of this denial. The history of Western reason and causality, which disguise the dysfunctionality of thinking in cognition with metaphysics, puts forward the most important question with regards to nihilism, namely, that who is Nietzsche’s God, who died? Heidegger also gives an account of a record that was found among the young Nietzsche’s notes from 1870, that were probably jotted down while he was working on the *The Birth of Tragedy*, which says: “I believe in the ancient German saying: all gods must die.”⁴ According to this, the disturbing thought of God’s or a god’s death was not alien to Nietzsche at the time he put down the foundations of his philosophy. Likewise, his phrases adopted from Hegel⁵ or Pascal, albeit the latter one is originally from Plutarch, “*Le grand Pan est mort*”⁶ belong to the same category, although possibly from the opposite reason.

The central figure in the evolution of nihilism is the truth-seeking Madman with the desire to find and know God. One of the “murderer of all murderers”, who in aphorism 125 of *The Gay Science* attempts to provide an explanation of the greatest and latest event, namely, that God is dead; however, seeing the dread around himself, he realizes this terrible event, although is on its way, has not arrived yet: “I come too early, – he said, then, – the time is not yet mine.”⁷ To the question what event occurred exactly in the world with God’s death, that is, with whom and with what can God be associated with, according to Nietzsche, a clear answer only arrives four years later in 1886. That is the time when Nietzsche adds a fifth book to the first four of *The Gay Science*, “We Fearless Ones” and its first aphorism provide the key to the mystery: “The greatest recent event – that ‘God is dead’; that the belief in the Christian God has become unbelievable – is already starting to cast its first shadow over Europe.”⁸ Nietzsche’s thesis is about the Christian God,⁹ more precisely, about

³ Heidegger 158.

⁴ Heidegger 161.

⁵ The young Hegel writes at the end of *Faith and Knowledge* “the feeling on which the religion of the modern age rests - the feeling that God Himself is dead” (qtd. in Heidegger 161.) Hegel, of course, has something different in mind than what Nietzsche claims.

⁶ Cf. Pascal’s Prophecy 695. “Great Pan is Dead” (*Thoughts* 238)

⁷ Nietzsche, aphorism 125, 120.

⁸ Nietzsche, aphorism 343, 199.

⁹ “‘God is dead.’ That is to say, the ‘Christian God’ has lost His power over beings and over the determination of man. ‘Christian God’ also stands for the ‘transcendent’ in general in its various meanings-for ‘ideals’ and ‘norms,’ ‘principles’ and ‘rules,’ ‘ends’ and ‘values,’ which are set ‘above’ the being, in order to give being as a whole a purpose, an order, and-as it is succinctly expressed - ‘meaning.’ (Heidegger, *Nietzsche* Vol. IV, 4) [“‘Gott ist tot.’ – Das will sagen: Der ‘christliche Gott’ hat seine Macht über das Seiende und über die

what cognition, which is forgotten and denied by metaphysics, identifies as God, as the supersensory.

“God is dead” means: the supersensory world has no effective power. It does not bestow life. Metaphysics, which for Nietzsche is Western philosophy understood as Platonism, is at an end. Nietzsche understands his own philosophy as the countermovement against metaphysics, i.e., for him, against Platonism.¹⁰

This is the true reason for and the meaning of the “reversal of all metaphysics”: by depriving idealism of power, the idealism that depends on the supersensory world; by demystifying it from metaphysics and reclaiming the rights of the sensory, that is the perceptible, real world; by redefining the concepts of value and truth. It is a limited and goal-oriented deconstruction that judges, selects and destroys among the momenta and the objects of cognition based on their infectedness by metaphysics. While, according to Heidegger, it incapacitates the complete horizon of knowledge in Western philosophy regardless, certainly in a sense that the Western spirit, the ideal-typical reality concept constructed by human conscience, cannot continue.

74

However, the metaphysical aspects and character of Platonic philosophy cannot irrevocably be separated from the structural foundations of thinking as such. This recognition is the motivation behind what Heidegger claims, that there is no “final” escape from metaphysics, there cannot be a complete only a temporary recovery, which is demonstrated by the difference between *Überwindung* and *Verwindung*. *Überwindung* in the Heideggerian language expresses the ultimate overcoming, the total denial and definite rejection of metaphysics, while *Verwindung* is temporary recovery, under certain conditions with a possibility for moving on. It is elaborated in a piece written to Jünger in 1955¹¹ where, according to its final conclusion, even the question with regards to overcoming metaphysics is wrong, erroneous since nihilism is not something that could be avoided, thus, the problem of nihilism is existence, the problem of being, a question about being per se. Jünger’s “line” cannot be crossed by the mind because the gesture of “stepping over” [*Über*]

Bestimmung des Menschen verloren. Der ’christliche Gott’ ist zugleich die Leitvorstellung für das ’Übersinnliche’ überhaupt und seine verschiedenen Deutungen, für die ’Ideale’ und ’Normen,’ für die ’Prinzipien’ und die ’über’ dem Seienden aufgerichtet sind, um dem Seienden im Ganzen einen Zweck, eine Ordnung und – wie man kurz sagt – einen ’Sinn zu geben’ ...” (Heidegger, *Nietzsche*. V. Der Europäische Nihilismus 33)]

¹⁰ Heidegger, *OtBT* 162.

¹¹ Heidegger and Jünger exchanged letters between 1949 and 1976, until Heidegger’s death. In 1955 Heidegger somewhat unusually congratulated Jünger on his 60th birthday in an “open letter”. This piece, which refers to the original title of Jünger’s paper, was published under the title *Über “Über die Linie”*, and later as *Zur Seinsfrage* in his *Wegmarken*, in which the part beginning with *Überwindung der Metaphysik* can be found, where Heidegger, contradicting Jünger’s theory, denies that metaphysics, as the root of European nihilism, could be overcome, if the Jüngerian „line” (*Linie*) was possible to be permanently crossed.

in itself becomes a metaphysical event; therefore, based on Heidegger's argument, we have to deal with the "line" [*die Linie*] itself.¹²

Trawny similarly refers to the same problem when he writes that the conceptual approach was difficult to Heidegger too, namely, how to differentiate precisely *Überwindung* and *Verwindung* from each other.¹³ Thinking as an event or movement, which occurs during the functioning of human intellect, constantly results in its own self-perceived metaphysical "foundation", projecting itself into some interpretable relation with it. Separating and isolating metaphysics from thinking could only be possible as impulse-momentum; for ephemeral moments, at the price of ceaseless self-destruction. This work is clearly inhuman. The proliferation of European nihilism becomes the identity-crisis of Western philosophy which for centuries has worked, seemingly with success, on the metaphysical image of reality, so long as the priority of being-thinkable in the understanding of being, as existence by an axiom-raising, extrapolating intellect, is against the priority of the senses and the sensory organs. The true recognition, which is equally important to Nietzsche, and later to Heidegger as well, is that the existence of being incessantly unsettles the basis of knowledge-projection, questioning the efficiency of deducing the metaphysical interpretation of reality, and the legitimacy to interpret existence at all. This recognition is partly supported by life that is omnipotent, acknowledged above all chaotic relations that change in time, straining between being, world and man in addition to life's sensory aspects and dimensions.

Heidegger, who, according to Derrida, feels somewhat entitled to be more competent than others when interpreting Nietzsche, to be more authentic so to speak, to have an "insight" into Nietzsche, seems sceptical when he is to form an opinion of any *benefits* this radical reversal entails.

¹² "Heidegger insists on the prior question about the *essence* of nihilism. Contrary to Jünger's *crossing the line*, Heidegger's main concern is the line itself: 'In the title of your essay *Über die Linie*, the *über* means as much as: across, *trans*, *meta*. By contrast, the following remarks understand the *über* only in the sense of *de*, *peri*. They deal *with* the line itself, with the zone of self-consummating nihilism.'" (Blok)

¹³ Cf. Trawny: "Wenn der Begriff der 'Überwindung' suggeriert, man könne wie über eine imaginäre Grenze von einer Geschichte in eine andere überwechseln, dann betont Heidegger die 'Dauer' des Vorgangs, der in einer ständigen Auseinandersetzung mit der 'Metaphysik' bestehe. Danach ergibt sich das Paradox, dass die 'Überwindung der Metaphysik' gerade darauf hinausläuft, die 'Metaphysik' bzw. ihre 'Grundbegriffe' immer wieder zu thematisieren; allerdings nicht auf beliebige Weise, sondern hinsichtlich der nichtmehr einfach nur philosophischen, sondern 'geschichtlichen Notwendigkeit', durch sie hindurch zu einem 'anderen Fragen' oder einem 'anderen Denken' zu gelangen. Insofern lässt sich nach Heidegger die 'Überwindung der Metaphysik' besser als eine 'Verwindung' begreifen." (117)

Since all it does is *turn metaphysics upside down*, Nietzsche's *countermovement against metaphysics* remains embroiled in it and has no way out; in fact it is embroiled in it to such a degree that it is sealed off from its essence and, as metaphysics, is *unable ever to think its own essence*. This is the reason that, for and through metaphysics, there *remains hidden what actually happens in and as metaphysics itself*.¹⁴

What is happening to metaphysics during Nietzschean deconstruction? It will not be able to meet the expectation to continue to function as metaphysics. Inverted, it is incapable of self-justification, it is deprived of the faculty of reflexion as a principle of metaphysics, which here is both essence and function. The possibility of metaphysics is being suspended. What is this if not pure deconstruction? Conformity, the security of the comparison-making human conscience is lost forever during the countermovement against metaphysics. If God, whom, based on his role in the supersensory realm, Nietzsche identifies as the *ground* and *goal* of all that is real, is dead, then for man even the easiest of questions are impossible to answer. What Nietzsche writes about this situation is no less sinister: “The time has come when we have to pay for having been Christians for two thousand years: we are losing the center of gravity by virtue of which we lived; We are lost for a while.”¹⁵

The logical consequence of the construction “God is dead” is the proliferation of Nothing, by which the “absence of a supersensory, binding world”¹⁶ [Abwesenheit] is meant. The Nietzschean countermovement defeating Platonic metaphysics inadvertently opens a door to a dreadful consequence, to nihilism, “the eeriest of all guests”.¹⁷

Based on the argument Nietzsche makes in his text “God is dead” we can conclude that what Heidegger primarily demands from the destructive Nietzschean countermovement is the ‘annihilation of metaphysics’ function. This argument could not be less surprising since the systematic interpretation or exploration of *function* in other contexts is also typical of Nietzsche’s approach and method. We could think of his writing about the peasant shoes in his aesthetics-themed “The Origin of the Work of Art” from 1936.

The equipmentality of equipment consists in its utility. But what about this utility itself? In understanding it do we already understand the equipmentality of equipment? In order for this to be so, must we not look out for the useful piece of equipment in its use? [...] The equipmentality of equipment consists indeed in its usefulness. But this itself rests in the fullness of an essential being of the equipment. We call

¹⁴ Heidegger, *OtBT* 162-3. (italics by me)

¹⁵ Nietzsche, *The Will to Power* 20.

¹⁶ Heidegger 163.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

*this reliability [...] in virtue of the reliability of the equipment [Van Gogh's peasant woman] is certain of her world.*¹⁸

By suspending the essence of metaphysics, by questioning its function during self-reflexion, Nietzsche's countermovement eliminated this security from the world. The utility of metaphysics as the organ of conscience ultimately lies in the ways it is capable of playing a role that is idiosyncratic from the beginning, namely, to guarantee the self-identity and safety of man in the world. With the suspension of metaphysics by nihilism, man cannot be certain in himself and the world. As in artworks, the truth of being occurs through art [Setzen] and "the being of the being comes into the constancy of its shining"¹⁹ [Scheinen], philosophy comes about through metaphysics, that is by the occurrence of being-in-the-world [Dasein]. Metaphysics cannot be separated from man's existential being, it is its *quasi* proof. When philosophy sets off with the help of our own existence jumping into the preconditions of being-in-the-world as a whole, we behave according to the supersensory realm; if this possibility is not available to our conscience, the conditions of being are not met.

77

Similarly, the metaphysical character of aesthetics cannot be denied, as long as any artwork proves by itself that for man as the recipient subject the objectivity of the original organizing principle, the *arché* is not given.²⁰ If it was possible to the recipient to understand, turning to the ultimate fulfilment would remain the only task for him in the effort of understanding. Artwork, however, like anything that is waiting to be interpreted, annuls this goal, or the *supposed striving-towards-the-goal*. "Thus our whole knowledge of art is at bottom entirely illusory, because, as knowing creatures, we are not one and identical with the essential being which gives itself eternal pleasure as the creator and spectator of that comedy of art."²¹

For Nietzsche nihilism means devaluation of the most distinguished values. „Was bedeutet Nihilismus? – Daß die obersten Werte sich entwerten. Es fehlt das Ziel; es fehlt die Antwort auf das 'Warum?'"²² This suggests that Nietzsche, like Heidegger later, saw nihilism as a process of history, more precisely, "the fundamental process of Western history" and "the intrinsic law of this history".²³ According to Heidegger's argument, the emphasis in Nietzsche's notion of nihilism

¹⁸ Heidegger, *OtBT* 13-14.

¹⁹ *Ibid* 16.

²⁰ "We maintain on the contrary that the entire opposition between the subjective and the objective (which Schopenhauer, too, still uses to divide up the arts, as if it were some criterion of value) is absolutely inappropriate in aesthetics since the subject, the willing individual in pursuit of his own, egotistical goals, can only be considered the opponent of art and not its origin." (Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* 32)

²¹ *Ibid*. 33

²² "What does nihilism mean? That the highest values devalue themselves. The aim is lacking; 'why?' finds no answer." (Nietzsche, *TWtP* 9)

²³ Heidegger 167.

is not on making the decline of the West “predictable” based on the history of European nihilism but that it should be thought of as the “inner logic” of the processes of Western history. During this process, as recognized by Nietzsche as well, during the devaluation of the noblest values ever, that is after the death of the Christian God, as inner logic, the world nonetheless survives, and this new valuelessness is “inevitably impelled toward a new dispensation of value”.²⁴

Nihilism, therefore, is at least in two ways present in Nietzsche’s interpretation. New values replacing the formerly highest values also means the re-evaluation of all values. As Heidegger claims, “the no to the former values is derived from the yes to the new dispensation of value.”²⁵ In this sense, in Nietzsche, the bestowal of new values, the programme of re-evaluation is also called nihilism, and its “classical” phase, in which the birth of new and exemplary values arise from the devaluation of old values; namely, the classical or completed phase of Nietzschean nihilism can be described by productive deconstruction: it is a reversal bringing new values to life. “The name ‘nihilism’ is therefore ambiguous [...] it always has two meanings from the start, in that it designates the pure devaluation of the former highest values, but at the same time it also means the absolute countermovement to devaluation.”²⁶ Nietzsche’s bipolar concept of nihilism²⁷ reports both on the “erosion” of values as the law of European history and on the efforts made against this world-process. What could be observed here is the enigmatic method of the reversed concept of truth again, so far as both nihilism as such and the anti-nihilist attempts to defeat it are in the hands of the readers, as the re-evaluation process is. In other words, for the total devaluation of values on the one hand, and for the momentum of new values being created on the other, Nietzsche applies the same term, leaving the key to the semantic and the contextual riddles pulsating in the text in the hands of the readers.

As it is clear from Heidegger’s reading, it is important to see that the re-evaluation of values does not mean some qualitative or quantitative substitution that could be described by and inserted in old schemes. By no means. The significance of distinguishing the ideas of *complete* and *incomplete* nihilism lies in exactly this. That the God of Christianity is dead, namely, that he disappeared from the world, does not mean that the space he filled before is not there anymore. Incomplete nihilism is, by its character, inclined to cling onto transcendence, to this empty space left by God in the supersensory world; moreover, it is inclined to make attempts at filling this space with some surrogate that was claimed to be competent for the role.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Heidegger, *OtBT* 167.

²⁶ Ibid. 167-168.

²⁷ Cf. “Nihilism. It is ambiguous: A. Nihilism as a sign of increased power of the spirit: as active nihilism. B. Nihilism as decline and recession of the power of the spirit: as passive nihilism.” (Nietzsche, *TWtP* 17)

Nothing could annoy Nietzsche more than this. “New ideals are being erected,”²⁸ claims Heidegger.

The different forms of *incomplete nihilism* as Wagner’s music or institutionalized faith of Christianity or the doctrines of asceticism all try to solve the problem, which arose from European nihilism, namely, the inevitably devalued values, and also try to fill in the empty space they left. The existence of the world as it is elaborated by Nietzsche in *The Birth of Tragedy* can only be justified by aesthetics.²⁹ Considering this construction, no such new ideas can be erected since this would practically serve to conceal the absence, that is the lack of genuine (original, archetypal) ideas. In a somewhat simplified way, we can say that *incomplete nihilism* does not recognize what happened to the value of values in nihilism. It does not see that what occurred to them is not only their devaluation but also that the *raison d’être* of their position or place-value has been suspended. This way the substitution of old values with new ones does not only fail to solve the problem of nihilism but it rather complicates practicality. “Incomplete nihilism; its forms: we live in the midst of it. Attempts to escape nihilism without reevaluating our values so far: they produce the opposite, make the problem more acute.”³⁰ Nietzsche identified this character of *incomplete nihilism* and all its forms in the world with metaphysics, ultimately with the inclination of man to perpetually make the same mistake of setting values and being occupied by the validity of things based on their values.

*The revaluing becomes a reversal of the nature and manner of valuing the dispensation of value requires a new principle, i.e., something that provides it with a point of departure and the place to maintain itself. The dispensation of value requires another realm. No longer can the principle be the world of the supersensory, now grown dead.*³¹

In Nietzsche’s hands that is how in the phase of complete nihilism the preoccupation with Nothing as an interpretation attached to nihilism takes its radical turn to the “ideal of the most abundant life.”³²

As György Kunszt argues, the mission of defeating nihilism in the situation of universal devaluation, according to Nietzsche, is to find the principle of setting new values [Prinzip einer neuen Wertsetzung]. In agreement with this statement, we might say that this task is especially difficult due to the divergence of the elements that constitute the concept of Nietzschean nihilism. As support we might turn to

²⁸ Heidegger 168.

²⁹ “for only as an aesthetic phenomenon is existence and the world eternally justified” (Nietzsche, *TBoT* 33)

³⁰ *TWiP* 19.

³¹ Heidegger, *OtBT* 169.

³² Ibid, cf. “‘Nihilism’ an ideal of the highest degree of powerfulness of the spirit, the over-richest life” (Nietzsche, *TWiP* 14)

Heidegger again, primarily because, as we saw, the principle of setting new values cannot just be thought of by merely loading up old values and truth claims with new content.

In chapter six of his Nietzsche-book, Heidegger defines the essence of Nietzsche's metaphysics by five key terms and five titles. These are the *will "to" power*, *nihilism*, the *eternal return of the same*, the *overman*, *justice*.³³ Among the lectures delivered by Nietzsche in Freiburg between 1936 and 1944, the list was rather similar with only a slight difference: nihilism [Nihilismus], *the revaluation of all values* [Umwertung aller bisherigen Werte], *the will to power* [Wille zur Macht], *the eternal return of the same* [Ewige Wiederkehr das Gleichen], *the overman* [Übermensch]. It is in these five fundamental categories that Heidegger observes the essence of what Nietzsche claims about metaphysics. The simultaneous analysis of the power of certain elements cannot be disregarded because, in themselves, they cannot be loaded with adequate meaningful content. "At the same time, each of these key expressions indicates what the remaining expressions say. Only when what they say is also thought along with the expression in question will the connotative force of each key expression be exhausted."³⁴

Therefore, the construction of metaphysics, as outlined by Nietzsche, can only be thought of as a relation between some of the five categories, their meaningful content coexists in our thinking. At the same time, Heidegger formulates a remarkably compact and generalized concept of metaphysics, which are based on the five fundamental categories; these are the being itself, beings as a whole, the being of truth, the history of truth, and finally, the humanity in sustaining truth. Based on his argument, this "fivefoldedness" outlines the domain to which the unified essence of metaphysics extends, and in which it is conceived over and over again.

Metaphysics is a way in which the truth of being in the history of the truth of being is manifested for humanity. For this reason, we might say that metaphysics is the truth of being that belongs to the being in the most universal way. This is still the case when it is clear that metaphysics with regards to its origins, searching for the truth that emerges from the being of beings, came to the direction where it attempted to defeat the elemental power of being in itself. Nihilism goes along with exactly this recognition, namely, that the truth of being is not identical with the truth that emerges from the being of beings, and we cannot speak about a total possession between them either.

³³ "'Will to power,' 'nihilism,' 'the eternal return of the same,' 'the overman,' and 'justice' are the five fundamental expressions of Nietzsche's metaphysics." (Heidegger, *Nietzsche* Vol. III 189)

³⁴ Ibid.

We might call it the fundamental metaphysical position of a thinker [metaphysische Grundstellung], without attributing to him the essential aspects of metaphysics as a whole. That the metaphysics of most thinkers cannot be extrapolated or invested with the general power proper to metaphysics is an important and derivative distinction. If we say “Kant’s metaphysics”, we merely talk about how the truth of being manifested for Kant in the history of truth so that as a thinker he was able to become who he is; thus, based on the manifestation of the truth of being, he could express being, that is the *being of being* within metaphysics.

Metaphysics as a method, with regards to its innermost essence and function, is a vehicle for the reception, the processing and the communication of truth that is manifested for the recipient during the being of being. Therefore, in this interpretation metaphysics is conceived over and over again and, therefore, as the fundamental philosophical character of being, it is attached to being, thus, for beings, it is not something that could be transcended since metaphysics is the truth of being as a whole.

Metaphysics is the inevitable truth of the history of being, a question, which, according to Heidegger, is related to, moreover, is one with nihilism as a world-event, its essence belonging to history, which, as history being a particular being, exist in essence. At the same time, metaphysics in its essence “would be the unthought – because withheld – mystery of being itself.”³⁵ If it was otherwise, would a thinking that is preoccupied with what should be thought about being be perpetually ask the question of “what is metaphysics?”³⁶

Based on this thesis, the interpretation of the essential truth of being cannot be lacking the fundamental characteristics of metaphysics; however, metaphysics as an evolutionary trend in Western philosophy can be shut down, turned into its own caricature.

*We must presume that philosophy will disappear as a doctrine and a construct of culture, and that it can disappear only because as long as it was genuine it identified the actuality of the actual, that is, Being, on the basis of which every individual being is designated to be what it is and how it is. “Fundamental philosophical doctrines” means what is taught in those doctrines [...] “Fundamental philosophical doctrines” means the essence of self-consummating metaphysics, which in its fundamental traits sustains Western history.*³⁷

Therefore, the question whether Nietzsche managed to go “beyond” or “transcend” metaphysics, at least on Heidegger’s part, could finally be considered to be resolved:

³⁵ Heidegger, *Nietzsche* Vol. III, 198.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.* 250.

“Das Denken Nietzsches ist *gemäß allem Denken des Abendlandes seit Platon Metaphysik.*”³⁸

We can agree with Heidegger without any risk that metaphysics as structural “Hubris”, as something that ceaselessly prompts conscience to reconceive of the intellectual foundations of its own thinking, and to recreate a goal-oriented order within cognition, can be identified as the fundamental and functional characteristic of Western philosophy. Nietzsche does not necessarily need to be defended against the Heideggerian statement above. At least not since we know that perhaps nobody had such a deep grasp of Nietzsche’s works and ideas as Heidegger did, who argues that the metaphysical perspective cannot “ultimately” be eradicated from thinking, it cannot simply be banished. Nietzsche can only in this context be interpreted as metaphysical; but we cannot ignore that he went furthest in the battle against metaphysics. The truth of this argument depends on how exactly we define metaphysics.

If metaphysics is taken, as represented by Heidegger, as something belonging to and determined by being thought in its essence, and therefore regard it as the inevitable truth that cannot be separated from it, and accept that during cognition it cannot be avoided since for the mind the world as a being simply cannot appear real, only then we could claim that neither Nietzsche’s thinking is rid of metaphysical constraints. However, if we are to ask for Derrida’s assistance involving the method of deconstruction, and attempt to disarm and expose the narrow-minded, truth-seeking symbolism of the language of metaphysics when approaching this topic, we get completely different results. In case the emphasis is not on metaphysics itself, not on the permanently self-constructing system of essence-seeking conscience, but instead, we try to dismantle the architecture, the layers, and the language of metaphysics into its components and interpret it this way, we draw in a new and fruitful uncertainty. This “loss of balance” is characteristic of Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics in particular. In a simplistic way, still within the domain of the Heideggerian concept of metaphysics (since its framework conditions are impossible to go beyond for the mind), if the internal order and the principles of metaphysics are intrinsically confused by systematic dismantling to the level of linguistic or grammatical elements, the pace and the direction of thinking is changed, causing a shift in the emphasis. All this is a Derridean recognition, that what is interesting ultimately is not the concept of metaphysics and the construct it can represent, but the function and direction of the metaphysical “construction” of the mind. Thus, by deconstruction, metaphysics as a framework can become empty, that is, recovery is possible.

³⁸ Italics by me. (Heidegger, *Nietzsche - Nietzsches Metaphysik* 257. [“Like all Western thought since Plato, Nietzsche's thinking is metaphysics.” (Heidegger 187)]

The essence is coded in pace and perspective. By dissecting concepts and the metaphysical framework to its elements, deconstruction attacks the seemingly solid foundations of the *status quo* represented by language. In this interpretation it is the same change in pace and perspective that was attempted by Nietzsche’s critique. Without this momentum, which is the key momentum of changing perspectives, the functional foundations of metaphysics are reproduced. The search for essence is metaphysics. As such, it is the fate of conscience, that is, the interpretation of being. Deconstruction on the other hand, with a different approach, will not going to concede to this conceptual and essential restriction.

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